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At the time that the Court was considering Terry v. Ohio,1 racial and social 
tensions in America were unsettled.2 Brown v. Board of Education had declared the 
insidious Jim Crow laws unconstitutional,3 but civil rights and social equality for 
African Americans were advancing slowly.4 Crime rates were increasing in the cities 
and police officers were using draconian heavy-handed tactics to enforce the law, 
especially in minority communities.5 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson issued an 
executive order that appointed a commission to study the crime problem.6 In its 
study, the Commission found that field interrogations—a tactic consisting of 
stopping, questioning, and if warranted, searching an individual who presents 
                                                                
 * Jesse N. Stone, Jr. Endowed Professor, Southern University Law Center. 
 1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 2. See generally LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA 386–440 
(5th ed. 1982). During the decade of the sixties the nation experienced several urban riots. Id. While Terry 
was pending before the Court, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968 in Memphis, 
Tennessee and, four days before Terry was announced by the Court, Bobby Kennedy was killed after winning 
the California presidential primary. Id. at 429, 432. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. See generally BENNETT, supra note 2, at 386–440. 
 5. See Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 491, 495 (1999). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 11,234, 30 Fed. Reg. 9,049 (July 16, 1965). 
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himself in a suspicious situation—were often used. 7  Although these practices 
were commonplace for most police officers, courts had not sanctioned them, but 
they also had not condemned the conduct.8 The Commission’s report pointed out 
the questionable police tactics and their effect on society.9 It found that police 
frequently abused their authority to conduct field interrogations and “in many 
communities, field interrogations [were] a major source of friction between the 
police and minority groups.”10 It further pointed out that police investigations were 
often undertaken with little or no basis for suspecting criminal activity, and “field 
interrogations are often conducted with little or no basis for suspicion.”11 
Police agencies that supported the procedure asserted that field 
interrogations, also known as stop-and-frisk, were not arrests and that they did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.12 
Proponents of stop-and-frisk argued that protecting society from potential crime is 
an essential component of police work.13 They contended that when an officer acts 
within constitutional limits he has the duty to investigate whenever such 
circumstances indicate to him that there are reasonable grounds requiring him to 
do so.14 The proponents also asserted, “[a] founded suspicion is all that is necessary, 
some basis from which the courts can determine that detention was not arbitrary 
                                                                
 7. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, AT 183–84.  
(1967), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/147374NCJRS.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. See 
also LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 10–17 (1967) (distinguishing “field interrogation” from traditional police 
procedures involving arrest or search incident to arrest). 
 8. Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and 
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 42–43 (1968). 
 9. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 184. See also David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, 
Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Courts Reality under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 981 (1998) (“‘Misuse of field interrogations . . . is causing serious friction with minority 
groups in many localities. This is becoming particularly true as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive 
patrol’ in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street . . . .”) (quoting 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 184). 
 10. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7 at 183. 
 11. Id. at 184. 
 12. See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320 (1942).  
 13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
 14. Brief for Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio at 15–16, Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67). See also Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control 
of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 433, 433434 (1967): 
[T]he proponents claim that the power to forcibly stop and to search for self-protection, a 
power long and widely exercised by police, is necessary to prevent crime in a period of 
frighteningly rising crime rates and civil disorders; further, that the invasion of personal liberty 
entailed by such a detention and search is relatively minor, is constitutional because 
reasonable, and can be controlled by the courts and by effective police administration. 
Opponents, on the other hand, dispute the need, the mildness of the affront, and the 
susceptibility to judicial control of such practices; they point to the evidence that such police 
tactics produce minority group resentment and hostility. Additionally, they deplore the 
abandonment of probable cause, the traditional constitutional standard necessary to deprive 
a person of his liberty, in favor of reasonable suspicion, which they find too vague. 
Id. 
 




or harassing.”15 It was their belief that the cursory frisk of the outer clothing is only 
a minor inconvenience and petty intrusion upon the rights guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.16 
The position taken by the proponents of stop-and-frisk had its flaws. First, 
their analysis established no standard to determine reasonableness for the stop. 
What facts or combination of facts are necessary to suggest that the officers had a 
reasonable, well-founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot? How do we weigh 
the facts in the totality of the circumstances? Next, and probably the most 
important question was: did the assertion that stop-and-frisk was something less 
than an arrest exclude it from constitutional scrutiny? Further, although it was 
accepted that an officer could stop an individual to ask basic questions about his 
identity and actions, there was little or vague guidance about where the informal 
investigatory stop ended and an arrest began.17 
Amidst the findings of the President’s Commission and the social setting, the 
Terry Court had the difficult task of balancing the police-purported need for a 
workable tool short of probable cause to use in temporary investigatory detentions 
and protecting the people’s constitutional right against the use of abusive police 
power. The solution had to be a delicate compromise that would not prevent 
proactive policing, but also would not permit unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The compromise had to restore minority communities’ confidence in policing and 
the judicial system. Before the Court’s decision was announced, the possibility of 
police abuse of a new standard that was not based on probable cause troubled 
some Justices on the Court.18 In a letter to Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan 
wrote that he believed the forthcoming opinion would give police officers licenses 
                                                                
 15. Brief for Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio, supra note 14, at 
16. 
 16. People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964). 
 17. Frank J. Remington, The Law Relating to “On the Street” Detention, Questioning and Frisking 
of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 386, 389–
90 (1960). 
 18. See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s 
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 825–26 (1998). 
 I've become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in Terry will be 
taken by the police all over the country as our license to them to carry on, indeed widely 
expand, present ‘aggressive surveillance’ techniques which the press tell us are being 
deliberately employed in Miami, Chicago, Detroit + other ghetto cities. This is happening, of 
course, in response to the ‘crime in the streets’ alarums being sounded in this election year in 
the Congress, the White House + every Governor's office. Much of what I suggest be omitted 
from your opinion strikes me as susceptible to being read as sounding the same note. This 
seems to me to be particularly unfortunate since our affirmance surely does this: from here 
out, it becomes entirely unnecessary for the police to establish ‘probable cause to arrest’ to 
support weapons charges; an officer can move against anyone he suspects has a weapon + 
get a conviction if he “frisks” him + finds one. In this lies the terrible risk that police will conjure 
up ‘suspicious circumstances,’ + courts will [crossed out: accept] credit their versions. It will 
not take much of this to aggravate the already white heat resentment of ghetto Negroes 
against the police--+ the Court will become the scapegoat. 
Letter from Justice William, J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren 2 (Mar. 14, 1968) (William J. 
Brennan, Jr. Papers are available through the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
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to conduct aggressive surveillance techniques in Black communities, subjecting 
the Court to the ire of African-American citizens.19 Yet, the Terry decision implies 
that the Court concluded the current state of law enforcement could not go 
unaddressed. The Court chose to adopt a rule requiring reasonable suspicion for 
temporary investigatory searches and seizures.20 This standard was less than the 
traditional probable cause requirement for police searches and seizures.21  
Considering the track record of the Warren Court regarding constitutional 
protections, it is not improper to assume its intent was to reach a decision that was 
fair and just.22 One scholar has called the Court’s decision in Terry “a practically 
perfect doctrine.”23 However, two major issues that ultimately defined the legacy 
of the decision were given desultory attention by the Court: (1) what is a Terry 
seizure and (2) what amount of evidentiary weight should be given to the inferences 
of the officer in the reasonable suspicion determination. 
This paper will consider what I believe is the most egregious mistake the Court 
made: its failure to define the “Terry stop.” The paper will address how this failure 
has endorsed interpretations of Terry that have subsequently legitimized racial 
profiling. Part I will succinctly provide the landscape of a temporary investigatory 
detention before Terry. Part II will take a close look at the Terry decision. Part III 
considers a companion case, Sibron v. New York, and how the Court disregarded the 
Terry decision adding further confusion to stop-and-frisk. Part IV discusses cases 
that are overreaching and that demonstrate an abuse of power by police officers 
when conducting investigatory stops. Part V describes how the “high-crime area” 
as used in Illinois v. Wardlow has become a cornerstone of racial profiling. Part VI 
examines “stop-and-frisk” in New York and the Floyd v. The City of New York 
opinion. Finally, I briefly conclude with a suggestion for the Court. 
I. TEMPORARY INVESTIGATORY STOPS BEFORE TERRY 
Before Terry v. Ohio, courts defined seizure in the terms of probable cause.24 
A person was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he was stopped 
by a police officer without a warrant issued upon the finding of probable cause or 
when an arrest was made without probable cause. 25  The principle that the 
Constitution requires probable cause for a valid arrest originates in the theory that 
an arrest constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the presence of probable cause is necessary to ensure that the seizure is 
                                                                
 19. Barrett, supra note 18. 
 20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down segregated education and 
providing the groundwork for many civil rights advances); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (developing 
the exclusionary rule for evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 23. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 
911 (1998). 
 24. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1979) (“Before Terry v. Ohio, the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons was analyzed in terms of arrest, 
probable cause for arrest, and warrants based on such probable cause.” (citations omitted)). 
 25. Id.  
 




“reasonable.” 26  Probable cause is the foundation of the Fourth Amendment. A 
search or seizure done without probable cause is presumed to be unreasonable.27 
Traditional probable cause for an arrest requires facts or circumstances that lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that a person had committed or was committing 
a crime.28  
Probable cause for an arrest to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements was 
not responsive to an important question. When does a police encounter with an 
individual for investigative purposes rise to the level of a seizure that is protected 
by the Fourth Amendment? Temporary informal detentions had long been a tool 
used by police officers to investigate suspected criminal activity.29 The Supreme 
Court decision of Mapp v. Ohio promulgated the exclusionary rule that required the 
suppression of evidence discovered in a search or seizure that violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement.30 Many believed that the exclusionary 
rule diluted police use of informal investigatory detentions as a method to detect 
crimes in a period in United States history where crime rates and police misconduct 
had increased.31 In light of this development, law enforcement agencies believed 
that informal investigatory detentions or stop-and-frisk—which they classified as a 
method that was less than an arrest, and therefore did not require probable 
cause—should receive special treatment by the courts.32 It was also their position 
that legislation should be drafted to protect a tool that was vital to crime detection 
and prevention.33 
To address these questions, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
promulgated statutes primarily adopting the Uniform Arrest Act of 1942.34 The Act 
provided guidelines to police officers in several areas.35 In particular, it provided 
guidelines on informal detention of an individual by a police officer when there is 
reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual had committed, is committing, or 
is about to commit a crime.36 The Act was designed to increase the scope of police 
                                                                
 26. Comment, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
848, 856, 862 (May 1965) [hereinafter Police Power] (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 
and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)). 
 27. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 28. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175176 (1949).  
 29. See Loren G. Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 532 (1967). 
 30. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
 31. See Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43; see also Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. 
Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004). 
 32. Stern, supra note 29, at 533–34. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Warner, supra note 12, at 316–17 (The Interstate Commission on Crime appointed a 
committee in 1939 to perform a study of the law of arrest in order to determine the possibility of drafting a 
model act to reconcile the law as written with the law in action). 
 35. Id. (The Committee drafted an act that covered nine topics: questioning and detaining 
suspects; searching suspects for weapons; the force permissible in making an arrest; the right to resist an 
illegal arrest; arrest without a warrant; summons instead of arrest; release of persons arrested; permissible 
delay in bringing before magistrate; and identification of witnesses). 
 36. Id. at 320–21. Section 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act states:  
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officers’ powers by allowing them to retain a person for two hours to investigate 
suspicious circumstances.37 It stated that the detention was not an arrest.38 Two 
other states, Massachusetts and New York, enacted similar statutes.39 Although the 
language of the state statutes varied, they permitted police officers to stop persons 
who they reasonably believed were engaged in or had engaged in criminal activity.40 
All of the states declared the statutes to be constitutional, albeit on different 
grounds.41 Whether the language used in the states’ statutes, allowing an informal 
detention on the standard of reasonable cause, was a proxy for probable cause was 
left undetermined.42 
To some extent, the United States Supreme Court finally weighed in on the 
issue of informal detentions in Rios v. United States.43 In Rios, two police officers 
“observed a taxicab standing in a parking lot next to an apartment” in a 
neighborhood that had a reputation for narcotics activity.44 “The officers saw the 
petitioner look up and down the street, walk across the lot, and get into the cab.”45 
“Neither officer had ever before seen the petitioner, and neither of them had any 
idea of his identity.”46 “Except for the reputation of the neighborhood, neither 
officer had received information of any kind to suggest that someone might be 
                                                                
 (1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to 
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him 
his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.  
 (2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his action to the 
satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.  
 (3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two hours. 
The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At 
the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged 
with a crime. 
Id.  
 37. Id. at 322. 
 38. Id. 
 39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.50 (McKinney 2018) 
(original version at ch. 996, § 1 (1970)). 
 40. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (Westlaw); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.50 (Westlaw); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1901–12 (West 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:1–25 (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-7-
1 to 13 (West 2018). 
 41. Police Power, supra note 26, at 855. 
 42. See De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244, 248–49 (Del. 1960) (The Delaware court found “that 
11 Del.C. § 1902 purports to govern, not arrests for crime which are governed by 11 Del.C. § 1906, but 
detentions of persons in the course of the investigating of crime. . . . We can find nothing in 11 Del.C. § 1902 
which infringes on the rights of a citizen to be free from detention except, as appellant says, ‘for probable 
cause’.”); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1964) (The Massachusetts court held “that 
G.L. c. 41, § 98, constitutionally permits a brief threshold inquiry where suspicious conduct gives the officer 
‘reason to suspect’ the questioned person of ‘unlawful design,’ that is, that the person has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit a crime. . . . An individual who acts in a suspicious way invites threshold 
investigation. It does not unreasonably invade the individual’s right of privacy to hold that the price of 
indulgence in suspicious behavior while abroad at night is a police inquiry.”). 
 43. 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
 44. Id. at 255–56. 
 45. Id. at 256. 
 46. Id. 
 




engaged in criminal activity at that time and place.”47 “The taxicab drove away, and 
the officers followed it in their car. . . .”48 At an intersection, the cab stopped for a 
traffic light.49 “The two officers alighted from their car and approached . . . the 
cab.”50 “[T]he petitioner dropped a recognizable package of narcotics to the floor 
of the vehicle; one of the officers grabbed the petitioner as he alighted from the 
cab; the other officer retrieved the package[.]”51 “The petitioner moved to suppress 
as evidence the package of heroin that the police had seized.” 52  After a brief 
argument by the petitioner’s counsel, the court granted the motion and entered a 
judgment of acquittal.53 The evidence in the case was subsequently given to United 
States authorities that instituted a federal prosecution.54  
The Court in Rios stated: 
[T]he Government argues that the policemen approached the standing taxi 
only for the purpose of routine interrogation, and that they had no intent 
to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a 
mission. If the petitioner thereafter voluntarily revealed the package of 
narcotics to the officers’ view, a lawful arrest could then have been 
supported by their reasonable cause to believe that a felony was being 
committed in their presence. The validity of the search thus turns upon the 
narrow question of when the arrest occurred, and the answer to that 
question depends upon an evaluation of the conflicting testimony of those 
who were there that night.55 
Although the Court did not directly address the standard required for an 
investigatory stop, it appears that the above statement recognized that a brief 
informal detention might be constitutional despite the fact that probable cause to 
arrest is absent.56 The lower courts still had to grapple with the problem of the 
relation between the statutory standard of reasonable suspicion and the 
constitutional standard of probable cause.  
II. TERRY V. OHIO  
The Supreme Court in Terry had an opportunity to resolve the confusion and 
set a standard for the lower courts to follow in cases involving an informal 
investigatory stop and seizure. In Terry, Detective Martin McFadden, an officer with 
thirty-five years of experience, noticed what he believed were three men, two of 
whom were African American, casing a store for a future robbery.57 He walked over 
                                                                
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Rios, 364 U.S. at 256. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 258. 
 53. Id.   
 54. Id. 
 55. Rios, 364 U.S. at 262. 
 56. Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Mass. 1964). 
 57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 56 (1968). 
 
518 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
to the three men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their names.58 
McFadden testified that he received a mumbled response to his inquiry.59 He then 
immediately grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down the outside of his 
clothing. 60  When McFadden felt a pistol in the inside breast pocket of Terry’s 
overcoat, he reached inside and retrieved a gun.61 The second man, Chilton, was 
also searched, and a gun was retrieved from him.62 Both men were charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon.63 
The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the guns on the 
ground that the officer, “on the basis of his experience, had reasonable cause to 
believe . . . that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some 
interrogation should be made of their action.”64 The court held that the officer had 
the right, for his protection, to pat down the outer clothing of these men who he 
reasonably believed might be armed.65 It “distinguished between an investigatory 
‘stop’ and an arrest, and between a ‘frisk’ of the outer clothing for weapons and a 
full-blown search for evidence of a crime.”66 Both men were found guilty of carrying 
a concealed weapon, and “the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed their appeal on the 
ground that no ‘substantial constitutional question’ was involved.”67 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether it 
is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a 
limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.68 The Court 
recognized this to be a difficult and sensitive issue that had never been squarely 
presented before the Court.69  
In addressing the issues presented by the police stop-and-frisk tactic, the 
Court first addressed whether stop-and-frisk, although a limited intrusion and not 
a full-blown arrest, rises to the level of search and seizure within the meaning of 
the Constitution.70 It held that a seizure occurs whenever a police officer accosts a 
person and restrains his freedom to walk away, and the Fourth Amendment applies 
to all such seizures.71 The Court also found that the thorough exploration of the 
outer clothing of an individual’s body “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment[.]”72 Again, 
the Fourth Amendment applies. Defining the scope of the search, the Court also 
stated, “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the 
                                                                
 58. Id. at 6–7. 
 59. Id. at 7. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
 64. Id. at 8. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9–10. 
 70. Id. at 16. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 17. 
 




circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”73  
At the heart of the case, the Court found that the rubric of police conduct that 
the case involved—“necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the beat”—had not and could not be subject to the 
warrant procedure.74 This action “must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s . . . 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 75  Borrowing the 
balancing test analysis from the Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,76 the 
Court stated: 
And in determining whether the seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’ 
our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.77 
Applying this analysis required the Court to balance the governmental interest 
that justified the intrusion against the invasion that the search and seizure 
entailed.78 It opined that a judge assessing the reasonableness in a stop-and-frisk 
case must judge the officer’s actions against an objective standard.79 That is, “would 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”80 
The Court agreed with the proponents of stop-and-frisk that the government 
interest in making a temporary stop of an individual suspected of a crime is crime 
detection and prevention.81 It asserted that in order to justify the intrusion “the 
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.”82  The Court further found that “[i]t was [a] legitimate investigative 
function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach [Terry] 
and his companions.”83 Considering the facts of the case, the Court stated, “[i]t 
would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ experience in 
the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to 
investigate this behavior further.”84 
After finding that the stop was reasonable within the confines of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court moved to the frisk. It announced that police officers’ safety 
while carrying out their duties is essential.85 The Court stated: 
                                                                
 73. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
 74. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See generally 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving administrative searches of homes, and 
specifically dealt with “administrative” and “special need searches”). 
 77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20. 
 78. Id. at 21. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 21–22. 
 81. Id. at 22.  
 82. Id. at 21. 
 83. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
 84. Id. at 23. 
 85. Id. at 24. 
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We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in 
investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of 
the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with 
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly 
and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to 
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of 
their duties.86 
Consequently, the Court held that if an officer reasonably believes the person 
he has stopped is armed and presently dangerous, he could take measures to 
determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon.87 This pat down of the 
outer clothing for weapons may subject an individual to some indignity and 
embarrassment.88 But, when an officer has reason to believe that the person he has 
engaged is dangerous and he may be armed, the cursory search is necessary to 
protect the safety of the officer.89 It is only a pat down of the outer clothing to 
detect weapons and not a search concomitant with a search incident to an arrest.90 
The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience, that 
would lead a prudent person to believe that his safety or the safety of others was 
in danger.91 
A. The Terry Stop 
In its decision, the Court failed to firmly decide when the Fourth Amendment 
seizure in Terry occurred. It recognized that some police stops do not require Fourth 
Amendment protection.92 The Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment seizure 
occurs when a police officer stops an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away from the encounter.93 Hence, the Fourth Amendment does govern seizures 
that are not full-blown probable cause arrests.94 The Court created a middle ground 
distinguishing a mere police encounter from an arrest. In essence, an officer can 
make a limited stop of a person when there is reasonable cause to believe that 
criminal activity is afoot. However, the Court was ambiguous about when the 
seizure occurred in the case.  The Court stated, “that Officer McFadden ‘seized’ 
petitioner and subjected him to a ‘search’ when he took hold of him and patted 
down the outer surfaces of his clothing.”95 In footnote 16 of the case, the Court 
defined the Terry seizure and applied it to the facts of the case. It stated: 
Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 
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in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 
‘seizure’ has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record 
whether any such ‘seizure’ took place here prior to Officer McFadden’s 
initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, 
and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon 
constitutionally protected rights had occurred.96 
It is obvious that Terry and Chilton were seized when Officer McFadden 
initiated physical contact with them. This was a significant restraint on their 
freedom to walk away. But, I suggest that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred 
when Officer McFadden approached the men to investigate what he had concluded 
was a potential crime. After observing the actions of Terry and his companions for 
some time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious and suspected 
that they were “casing a job, a stick-up.” 97  He considered it was his duty to 
investigate the situation further.98 He also stated that he feared the men could have 
had a gun, and “the situation was ripe for direct action.” 99  Hence, Officer 
McFadden’s initial contact with Terry and Chilton was more than just an attempt to 
engage in non-confrontational conversation about their intentions. He had 
concluded that a crime was in progress and an investigation was necessary. When 
an officer approaches a suspect to investigate what he believes to be criminal 
activity, it is not a casual conversation. It is incredulous to assume that a person 
who is stopped by such a police officer will feel free to leave and walk away.100 
Under the circumstances in the case, using the Court’s definition of a seizure, Terry 
and Chilton were seized when Officer McFadden confronted them to investigate 
perceived criminal activity.  
The Terry Court’s finding that the seizure of Terry occurred when Officer 
McFadden initiated physical contact to search him is more perplexing in light of two 
other statements in Terry: (1) “[T]hat a police officer may in appropriate 
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of 
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to 
make an arrest[,]”101 and, (2) “[i]t would have been poor police work indeed for an 
officer of 30 years’ experience in the detection of thievery from stores . . . to have 
failed to investigate this behavior further.”102 The first statement implies that a 
police officer may approach a person to investigate a crime on a standard that is 
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less than probable cause. The second infers that Officer McFadden, using the 
standard in the former statement, was obligated to conduct the investigation of 
Terry and his companions. These statements, taken together, suggest, and rightly 
so, that a seizure occurs at the initial stop to investigate what an officer reasonably 
believes to be potential criminal activity.  
B. Sibron v. New York Inconsistency 
The Court’s decision in Terry was further complicated by its decision in Sibron 
v. New York,103 a case decided on the same day. Better known for its introduction 
of the reasonable suspicion language for stop-and-frisk, 104  the Sibron decision 
demonstrated the Court’s uncertainty about the fledgling holding in Terry. In Sibron, 
a police officer observed Sibron for approximately eight hours.105 During that period 
of time, the officer saw Sibron in conversation with six or eight persons whom he 
knew to be narcotics addicts. 106  The officer “did not overhear any of these 
conversations,” and he did not see anything pass between Sibron and the men.107 
Later Sibron met with three other men who the officer identified as addicts.108 Once 
again, nothing was overheard, and he saw nothing pass between Sibron and these 
men.109 When Sibron sat down and ordered his food, the officer ordered him to 
come outside.110 The officer then said to Sibron, “You know what I am after.”111 
“According to the officer, Sibron ‘mumbled something and reached into his pocket.’ 
Simultaneously, [the officer] thrust his hand into the same pocket, discovering 
several glassine envelopes” that contained heroin.112 
Ironically, the Court in Sibron did not use the Terry decision to render its 
holding.113 It held that the police officer lacked probable cause to arrest Sibron, and 
therefore, the warrantless search by which the police officer discovered heroin on 
him could not “be justified as incident to a lawful arrest.”114 The officer heard none 
of the conversations that Sibron had with the addicts, and he observed no exchange 
among the men.115 “The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are 
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engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable 
inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s 
personal security.”116 The Court further found that the search could not be justified 
as a self-protective search for weapons. 117  The officer never indicated that he 
believed Sibron was armed or that he feared for his life.118  
In reaching its decision that the stop of Sibron was an arrest and the search 
violated the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
mentioned Terry v. Ohio on several occasions.119 Yet, despite the fact that Terry 
delineated a new standard for investigatory stops the Court did not use the 
standard announced in Sibron.120 The officer’s statement to Sibron and the act of 
rummaging through Sibron’s pocket was no more intrusive than the physical force 
used by McFadden to stop Terry. Hence, Terry, the Court’s earlier decision, should 
have been controlling. 
Applying Terry’s rationale, that is, the seizure occurred when Officer 
McFadden grabbed Terry and Chilton to conduct a search, to the facts of Sibron 
implies that there was a Terry stop of Sibron when the officer accosted him and 
reached into his pocket. The officer’s actions did not result in an arrest as suggested 
by the Sibron Court.121 If Sibron was arrested when he was accosted, the results 
should have been the same in Terry, and Sibron has overruled Terry. The standard 
remains probable cause for an investigatory stop.122 The contradiction between 
Terry and Sibron, and Terry’s failure to clearly define a seizure left open the question 
of when a Terry stop occurs. The Court has made other attempts to define a Terry 
seizure, but they have only further muddled the waters. 
III. STRETCHING TERRY 
A. Mendenhall and Royer  
United States v. Mendenhall attempted to clarify what constituted a Terry 
investigative stop. 123 At an international airport, DEA officers profiled Mendenhall 
as someone who might be transporting drugs.124 The officers stopped Mendenhall, 
identified themselves, and asked for her identification and airline ticket. 125 
Mendenhall’s answers to the officer’s questions and the documents that she 
presented were inconsistent, and she appeared to be very nervous.126 The officers 
returned Mendenhall’s ticket and driver’s license, and asked her to accompany 
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them “to the airport[’s] DEA office for further question[ing].”127 She voluntarily 
followed them.128 During questioning, Mendenhall agreed to a search and heroin 
was found.129 Mendenhall argued that the officers seized her in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.130 
The Court in Mendenhall admitted that Terry did not decide if a seizure 
occurred “before the officer physically restrained Terry” to search him. 131  To 
address this omission in Terry, the Court stated:  
We conclude that a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 
to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might 
be compelled.132  
The Court found that “nothing in the [facts] suggest[ed] that [Mendenhall] had 
any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation” and 
leave.133 What does it mean that a reasonable person would believe that he is not 
free to leave? What happens if a person attempts to end the encounter with a police 
officer?  
In an attempt to answer the above questions, the Court in Florida v. Royer134 
found: 
The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to 
him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on 
his way. . . . [H]is refusal to listen or answer questions does not, without 
more, furnish [reasonable, objective grounds to detain them].135 
Mendenhall’s addition to the definition of seizure—whether a reasonable 
person would feel free to leave—and Royer’s attempt to clarify—a person’s refusal 
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to listen to the officer or answer questions alone does not provide reasonable 
suspicion—gave credence to prospective abuses of Terry’s stop-and-frisk doctrine. 
The Court’s continuous ambiguity left the door open for unequal application of 
Terry in cases with circumstances that directly affect minorities. 
B. INS v. Delgado 
For instance, in I.N.S. v. Delgado, 136  a case involving an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service search of a factory looking for illegal immigrants, the Court 
found that workers in the factory were not seized when several officers questioned 
employees at their workstations while other officers stood at the factory’s door to 
ensure that all employees were interviewed.137 The Court stated: 
We reject the claim that the entire work forces of the two factories were 
seized for the duration of the surveys when the INS placed agents near the 
exits of the factory sites. Ordinarily, when people are at work their 
freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the 
actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary 
obligations to their employers. . . . 
 . . . 
 . . . The manner in which respondents were questioned, given its 
obvious purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents 
were not free to continue working or to move about the factory.138  
It is inconceivable that the Court in Delgado would find that the immigrants in 
the factories were not seized. The threatening presence of several agents 
throughout the factories and at all entrances drastically curtailed the workers’ 
freedom to leave or move about the factory.139 Placing armed agents at every point 
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of egress to a building is a demonstration of official authority. The obvious 
function of surrounding and securing of the exits was “to produce [the appearance 
of] a captive workforce.”140 It is only reasonable for an individual to infer that the 
officers’ intent is to restrict egress from the building and that he is not free to leave. 
This is shown by the workers’ response to the agents when they entered the 
building. “[U]pon entry of the INS investigators into the plants, the employees 
shouted ‘La Migra’ and a large number of employees began running around the 
factory or hiding.”141  
The persistent surveying of practically every employee further implied to the 
workers that they were not free to leave unless they responded to the agent’s 
questioning. The agents systematically “approached employees and, after 
identifying themselves, asked them from one to three questions relating to their 
citizenship.”142 If the employee gave what the agent considered “an unsatisfactory 
response or admitted that he was an alien, the employee was asked to produce his 
immigration papers.”143 The procedure used by the INS involved more than mere 
questioning or a casual conversation with the employees. 144  The agents were 
investigating criminal activity (illegal immigration) based on an anonymous tip that 
the factories may be hiring illegal immigrants.145 This is a classical demonstration of 
the type of temporary investigatory detention that Terry was designed to address. 
The INS officers detained the immigrants at the factory based on circumstances that 
led them to reasonably believe that criminal activity was afoot. 146  The Fourth 
Amendment was implicated.147  
The Court totally disregarded facts about the individuals encountered, such as 
their previous experiences with INS agents, cultural background and understanding 
of law enforcement authority, or their lack of experience in the American criminal 
justice system. 148  Such factors could be important in deciding whether the 
deliberate circumstances of the seizure led the employees to believe their freedom 
was significantly impeded.149 Delgado’s expansion of the Terry seizure became a 
race-specific tool that law enforcement officers used to curtail what they perceived 
as potential illegal activity.  
C. Florida v. Bostick 
In Florida v. Bostick, “two officers, [as part of a drug interdiction effort,] 
complete with badges, insignia and one of them holding a recognizable zipper 
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pouch, containing a pistol, boarded a bus” on a scheduled stopover. 150 Without 
articulable suspicion, the officers picked out Bostick, an African American male, who 
was seated in the back of the bus and asked to inspect his ticket and 
identification.151 Finding nothing remarkable about the ticket and identification the 
officers returned them to Bostick. 152  They then requested Bostick’s consent to 
search his luggage.153 He consented and drugs were found.154 Bostick moved to 
suppress the cocaine on the grounds that it had been seized in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.155  
Relying on Delgado, the Court held: 
[W]hen the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the 
degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave 
is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.  
Here, for example, the mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the 
bus does not mean that the police seized him. Bostick was a passenger on 
a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would not have felt free to leave 
the bus even if the police had not been present. Bostick’s movements were 
“confined” in a sense, but this was the natural result of his decision to take 
the bus; it says nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue 
was coercive.156 
Bostick relied on two factors to determine if a seizure occurred: (1) was there 
coercive police conduct, and (2) the fact that Bostick’s detention may have been 
consensual because he was a voluntary passenger on the bus.157 It summarized the 
test for a seizure as:  
[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a 
seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to 
decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. That 
rule applies to encounters that take place on a city street or in an airport 
lobby, and it applies equally to encounters on a bus.158  
Although the Court did not decide whether a seizure occurred in Bostick, it 
maintained that the facts left “some doubt” that Bostick was seized.159 This suggests 
that the Court believed Bostick was free to leave at all times during the encounter. 
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Again, the Court failed to consider the factors it announced in Mendenhall, in 
particular, the threatening presence of officers, display of a weapon, and the 
officers’ language or tone of voice that might suggest that compliance is required.160 
The pervasive and authoritative conduct displayed by the agents in both Delgado 
and Bostick communicated to the defendants that they were not free to leave. The 
fact that a person is voluntarily seated on a bus or at his workplace does not 
authorize the police to force an encounter upon him.161 His choices are submitting 
to police questioning or walking away and facing the consequences of delaying his 
travel or losing his job. Placing a person in a situation where he must decide 
between submitting to police detention and socially and personally acceptable 
behavior is a seizure that requires Fourth Amendment protection.162  
IV. ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW 
A. High Crime Area 
The Delgado, Royer, and Bostick decisions were not the end of the Court’s 
inability to comprehend the effect that the failures in Terry would have on the use 
of race in policing. The failure to properly define the new standard devised in Terry 
left the door open for judicial review that would distort its original intention, and 
that would lead to greater abuse of police power than that experienced in the 
1960s.163  
In Illinois v. Wardlow, police working as uniformed officers in the special 
operations section of the Chicago Police Department were driving the last car of a 
four-car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking.164 An 
officer in the car observed Wardlow holding an opaque bag and standing next to a 
building.165 Wardlow looked in the direction of the officers and fled.166 The officers 
eventually cornered Wardlow. 167  One of the officers then exited the car and 
immediately conducted a pat-down search for weapons.168 “During the frisk, [the 
officer] squeezed the bag [Wardlow] was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object 
similar to the shape of a gun.”169 The officer then opened the bag, discovered a .38-
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caliber handgun, and Wardlow was arrested.170  
The Supreme Court, upholding the police seizure of Wardlow, adopted a per 
se rule that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area is sufficient suspicion for an 
officer to detain an individual.171 The Court recognized that either presence in a 
high-crime area or flight taken alone does not meet the standard of reasonableness 
required by the Fourth Amendment.172 Relying on Terry, it surmised that presence 
in a high-crime area plus other circumstances could suggest reasonable 
suspicion.173 It stated: “Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate 
act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.” 174  Police “officers are not required to ignore the relevant 
characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are 
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”175  
The Court found that the officers were converging on an area known for drug 
activity and they anticipated encountering several people.176 It was under these 
circumstances that they decided to investigate Wardlow when he fled. 177 
Terry’s standard permits an officer to conduct an investigatory stop when he 
observes “unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”178 It was meant to assist police 
officers to carry out the tasks of crime detection and crime prevention by allowing 
them to investigate actual or potential criminal activity.179 The Court in Wardlow 
disregarded Terry’s stated purpose and its required standard. Flight in a high-crime 
area is surely not criminal activity, and it is not suggestive of such.  
The Court in Wardlow made perfunctory mention of the reasons for 
Wardlow’s flight and whether it suggested criminal activity. It found that Wardlow’s 
conduct “was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation.”180 Based on 
Terry, the Court determined that “the officers could detain the individuals to resolve 
the ambiguity.” 181  However, these factors—the ambiguity and innocent 
explanations for the flight—highly suggest that the officers did not reasonably 
suspect Wardlow was engaged in criminal activity.  
Although the Terry test for reasonable suspicion was amorphous and devoid 
of substance, the Court expressed the mandate that an officer must be able to 
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articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of 
criminal activity.182 This particularized and objective assessment is based upon all 
of the circumstances known to the officer, and it must raise a suspicion that the 
particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.183 When the officers 
first noticed Wardlow, he was standing next to a building holding a bag.184 Standing 
next to a building holding a bag is clearly not indicative of criminal activity. Next, 
Wardlow looked in the direction of the officers and fled. 185  The Court labeled 
Wardlow’s flight as unprovoked. However, it did not explain why it considered the 
flight to be unprovoked. Further, the record in the case does not disclose that sirens 
were blaring or commands to stop were given to Wardlow. 186  In its brief, the 
respondent argued: 
Arguably, Respondent fled at the sight of four police cars and eight police 
officers, who converged on that location simultaneously. This behavior is 
not innately suspicious and is not . . . “unprovoked flight from a police 
officer”. . . .  
Respondent's flight from a caravan of police cars, when viewed in “the 
whole picture,” did not provide objective criteria pointing to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.187  
It is unclear from the Court’s decision or the record why looking in the 
direction of the officers would suddenly compel Wardlow to run. Wardlow could 
have run for several reasons, none of which would rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion.188  Wardlow may have run because he was late for an appointment, 
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consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From 
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences and 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person. 
 . . . .  
 The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must 
yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a 
suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. 
Id. at 41718. 
 184. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121. 
185. Id.   
 186. Brief for the Respondent at 22, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036), 1999 
WL 607000. 
 187. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 188. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting)  
 




exercising, or going to meet a friend. These options are innocent and, usually, do 
not prompt a stop from a police officer.189 In many minority localities, the sight of 
four police cars converging on a location prompts the inhabitants to flee. Criminal 
activity is not the precursor for the flight.190 Because of past experiences with police 
officers, self-preservation is more important than waiting around to see what 
transpires.191 Nothing suggests that the officers’ seizure of Wardlow was based on 
reasonable suspicion that Wardlow was engaged in criminal activity.192 
By making unprovoked flight in a “high crime area” grounds for reasonable 
suspicion, the Court has given police officers carte blanche authority to stop 
minorities. First, the Court gave no guidance that would assist in determining a high-
crime area.193 It only made mention of “an area of heavy narcotics trafficking” 
without further explanation of other factors relevant to the determination.194  
A United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit case, United States v. 
Wright,195 decided after Wardlow, citing several cases found that the determination 
of a “high crime area” is a factual question that can be proved by a combination of 
several factors: 
(1) [T]he nexus between the type of crime most prevalent or common in 
the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case[;] (2) limited 
geographic boundaries of the “area” or “neighborhood” being evaluated[;] 
and (3) temporal proximity between evidence of heightened criminal 
activity and the date of the stop or search at issue[.]196  
                                                                
 The question in this case concerns “the degree of suspicion that attaches to” a person’s 
flight—or, more precisely, what “commonsense conclusions” can be drawn respecting the 
motives behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons—to 
catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive 
at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a 
pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature—
any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. 
Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 9, at 994. 
 190. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 680–81 (1994).  
 191. See Adam B. Wolf, Case Note, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 711, 717 (2000); see also Tracey 
Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should 
Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 253 (1991) (“[b]lack men know they are liable to be stopped at anytime, 
and that when they question the authority of the police, the response from the cops is often swift and 
violent.”). 
192.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121–22. 
193.  Id. at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 194. Id. at 124. 
 195. 485 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 196. Id. at 53–54. (citations omitted). In most cases, the relevant evidence for this factual finding 
will include some combination of the following: (1) the nexus between the type of crime most prevalent or 
common in the area and the type of crime suspected in the instant case, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 
(noting that the area was not simply generally crime-ridden, but was particularly “known for heavy narcotics 
trafficking,” where the defendant was suspected of drug activity); United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 
60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the finding of a high crime area was supported by the similarity between the 
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This definition recites evidence commonly used to suggest a high crime area. 
However, it omits a factor from Terry that has become prevalent and controlling in 
investigatory stops in minority neighborhoods: police discretion based on the 
officer’s experience. 197  When determining whether the evidence presented to 
show the reasonableness of the police officer’s actions meets constitutional 
muster, the courts tend to give immense deference to the police officer’s 
discretion.198 Because of the deference given to police officers’ experience, any 
combination of the factors stated in Wright will result in the police officer 
characterizing a location as a high crime area.199  
B. Wardlow’s “High Crime Area,” and Police Discretion 
On June 18, 1971, President Nixon, in a press conference, declared that drugs 
are “public enemy number one in the United States” and he announced a war on 
drugs.200 This war on drugs quickly became a war on crime that escalated police use 
of drastic investigatory practices under the guise of Terry. Because it was presumed 
that most illegal drug activity occurred in minority communities, they were 
considered as high crime areas where drug investigatory stops should be 
conducted. 201  The term “high crime area” became synonymous with inner city 
African-American and Hispanic communities.202 The Supreme Court legitimized the 
                                                                
type of crime commonly found at that location and the type of crime for which the police suspected this 
defendant); (2) limited geographic boundaries of the “area” or “neighborhood” being evaluated, e.g., 
United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming a district court’s finding of a high 
crime area, in part, because the evidence of frequent crime was specific to the exact intersection where the 
stop occurred); United States v. Montero–Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We 
must be particularly careful to ensure that a ‘high crime’ area factor is not used with respect to entire 
neighborhoods or communities in which members of minority groups regularly go about their daily 
business, but is limited to specific, circumscribed locations where particular crimes occur with unusual 
regularity.”); and (3) temporal proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of 
the stop or search at issue, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 874–75, 877 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming 
high crime area finding, in part, because of criminal activity during week prior to the stop at issue, occurring 
in same location as the stop). Evidence on these issues could include a mix of objective data and the 
testimony of police officers, describing their experiences in the area. 
 197. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (“And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably 
in such circumstances, due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which he is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”). 
 198. See Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and The Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment 
Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 172 (1994). 
Professor Magee argues that courts have developed a good cop paradigm, and “the Court has advanced the 
paradigm more broadly throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by exhibiting faith, if not reverence, 
for police and their decision making.” 
 199. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Consider the appropriateness of the Terry 
stop “not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement”—the police themselves. 
 200. Richard Nixon, Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control, 1971 Pub. Papers 738, 739 (June 17, 1971). 
201. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug 
War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 869–76 (2002). See also, Tovah Renee Calderón, Race-
Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW. L.J. 73, 90–91 (2000). 
 202. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence from Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 
 




use of locale as an appropriate element in the Terry analysis in at least two cases 
besides Wardlow.203 In Adams v. Williams, the Court found that a police officer 
conducting an investigatory stop in a high crime area has reasonable ground to fear 
for his safety.204 In Maryland v. Buie, the Court stated, “[e]ven in high crime areas, 
where the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires 
reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be 
conducted.”205 
Professor Lewis Katz believes that consequently lower courts have made high 
crime areas the centerpiece of the Terry analysis.206 He states: 
Consequently, lower courts give enormous weight to this collateral factor, 
often requiring little more than some other innocuous bits of information 
to fulfill the reasonable suspicion requirement justifying a stop . . . . By 
sanctioning investigative stops on little more than the area in which the 
stop takes place, the phrase “high crime area” has the effect of 
criminalizing race. It is as though a black man standing on a street corner 
or sitting in a legally parked car has become the equivalent to “driving 
while black” for motorists.207 
The Terry Court was aware that the frequency of stops in minority 
communities, and the police use of force to conduct the stops were problems at the 
time that the case was decided.208 Yet, it established the officer’s discretion as a 
pivotal factor in the equation of reasonable suspicion for a Terry seizure.209 This 
approach to the problem is myopic in light of the potentially damaging effect that 
the case could have on minority communities.  
Terry’s reasonable suspicion test requires “specific articulable facts” that may 
include inferences that an officer can draw from those facts based on his 
experience.210 The expansions of Terry have moved towards a test that is based on 
“a healthy respect for the deductive processes of trained officers.” 211  In many 
instances, the locale and conclusions drawn by the officer become the primary basis 
for an investigatory stop. 212 A good illustration of this point is United States v. 
                                                                
AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590, 1611 (2008). See also, Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment 
Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 386 (2001).  
 203. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 
(1990); see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 11.3.2.2, 481 
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cause was present). 
 204. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147–48.  
 205. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n.2.  
 206. Katz, supra note 31, at 493. 
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Jordan.213 In Jordan, Baton Rouge City Police Officers were patrolling what was 
described as a high crime area of the city that is noted for frequent drug activity, 
robberies, rapes, and murders.214 The officers saw Jordan “running at full sprint” 
from the direction of a store located about a block away.215 “As they observed 
Jordan, they saw him ‘looking back over his shoulder . . . . At one point he tripped 
and fell to the ground, immediately got up and continued into a full sprint.’”216 
“The officers, concluding that Jordan may have robbed the grocery store, 
pulled their car in front of Jordan and stopped him.”217 Jordan was instructed to 
place his hands on the hood of the car. 218  He refused to do so. 219  Jordan was 
handcuffed, and searched.220 A weapon was found in his pant leg.221  Jordan moved 
to suppress the evidence contending that the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio.222 The government 
argued “that the totality of the circumstances, including Jordan’s running, the 
proximity of the store, his furtive glances over his shoulder, the time (6:45 p.m. on 
a January evening) and place (a high crime area), justified the officer’s decision to 
stop Jordan.”223  
Relying on Wardlow, the court agreed with the government and it stated: 
The undisputed facts in the instant case clearly do not portray a 
recreational runner. The defendant appeared to be fleeing from something 
or someone. This conduct, combined with the time and place, was at least 
as “ambiguous” as the observation in Terry that two individuals were 
“pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and 
periodically conferring.” The officers were justified in detaining the 
defendant briefly to resolve this ambiguity.224 
The scant facts in this case do not suggest reasonable suspicion. They only 
suggest that the officers subjectively concluded that Jordan was running because 
he was involved in criminal activity. The officers did not present inferences that 
were drawn from the facts observed. But, they offered a conclusion that was based 
on their observation that Jordan was running in a direction away from a store at 
6:45 p.m. in what was deemed a high crime area. No objective reasons were given 
for Jordan’s sprint. Actually, the officers first noticed Jordan because he was 
running.225 The facts do not suggest that Jordan’s running was provoked by the sight 
of the officers as was the finding in Wardlow.226 Also, the officers cited no facts that 
                                                                
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 448. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Jordan, 232 F.3d at 448. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 449. 
 224. Jordan, 232 F.3d at 449 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 677 (2000)).  
 225. Jordan, 232 F.3d at 448. 
 226. Id. at 449. 
 




supported a robbery of the store had occurred.227  
The court’s ruling in Jordan implies that there is no reason to run in a “high 
crime area” except involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion in this 
case was founded on the officers’ belief that an African American male running in a 
locale where crimes occur equates to criminal involvement. With little discussion, 
the court gave great weight to the officers’ observations and conclusions.  
Weak facts similar to those in Jordan are prevalent in the reasonable suspicion 
equation when police officers encounter citizens in inner-city and/or poor 
neighborhoods.228 Although the cases vary, more often than not, courts are inclined 
to follow the officers’ lead regardless of the reasonable inferences that can be 
gleaned from the facts of the case.229 Terry’s failures have developed a dilemma 
that is destined to get worse if policy changes are not implemented.  
Consider, what I call the double-edged sword for African American men; not 
only are they suspects in a high crime area, but they are also suspects in locations 
where they traditionally do not belong. In Terry, Officer McFadden testified that 
Terry and Chilton caught his attention because “they didn’t look right to me at the 
time” and he just didn’t like them.230 African American men may attract a police 
officer’s attention simply because the officer believes he does not belong where he 
is observed.231 A good example of this is the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George 
Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch volunteer, in a gated community in Sanford, 
Florida. 232  On the night of the shooting, Zimmerman called 911 after noticing 
                                                                
 227. Id. at 448.  
 228. One recent incident involved a call that I received from the son of a friend who is deceased. 
The young man and a friend drove up to his deceased dad’s home (in a high crime area) to clean and make 
some repairs when they were stopped by a police officer of the city’s Crime Detection Unit. The officer 
asked what they were doing and they explained that they were cleaning the house and making repairs so it 
could be sold. The officer then asked if they had drugs. The young men responded “no,” and the officer 
asked to search the car. The deceased friend’s son immediately told the officer that there was a gun in the 
glove compartment, but the papers designating the gun as legal were also in the car. The officer searched 
the car and found the gun in the glove compartment along with the papers. The officer then called dispatch 
and ran a check on the young man. The dispatcher advised the officer that there was an outstanding arrest 
warrant for the unpaid tickets against the young man. When giving the dispatcher the information on the 
young man the officer failed to mention the “Jr.” in his name. The outstanding warrant was actually for his 
deceased dad. The young man was arrested. He spent a night in jail, and he missed two days from work 
clearing up the matter. The young man’s only crime was that his dad’s home was located in a high crime 
area.  
 229. Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895 (Pa. 2012) (finding the evidence missing was 
missing crucial element that Washington was knowingly running from the police); United States v. Wright, 
485 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding reasonable suspicion for a stop stating: “Wright's running was 
‘unprovoked . . .  upon noting the police.’”); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding 
reasonable suspicion to stop Valentine on tip from an unidentified informant, and Valentine matched the 
description given, and he was walking in a high crime area at 1:00 a.m.). 
 230. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). 
 231. Russell L. Jones, A More Perfect Nation: Ending Racial Profiling, 41 Val. U.L. Rev. 626, 628 
(2006). 
 232. Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 2012), 
https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/index.html. 
 
536 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
Trayvon. 233  He reported a “real suspicious guy[.]” 234  Zimmerman told the 
dispatcher “this guy looks like he is up to no good, or he’s on drugs or something. 
It’s raining, and he’s just walking around.”235 Unknown to Zimmerman, Trayvon was 
headed to his father’s residence in the neighborhood after going to the store to buy 
snacks.236 When Zimmerman approached Trayvon, a scuffle occurred and Trayvon 
was shot to death.237 Trayvon caught Zimmerman’s attention because “he[] [was] a 
black male” and “they always get away.”238 Zimmerman assumed that Trayvon did 
not belong in the community because of his race. Police officers also will often single 
out an individual not because of his criminal activity, but because of his race or 
ethnicity.239  
V. NEW YORK CITY POLICE AND STOP-AND-FRISK 
The most notorious exploitations of Terry’s failures have occurred under state 
statutes that were enacted to give guidance on stop-and-frisk. This is best 
documented in the New York City police department’s application of its stop-and-
frisk statute. New York’s statute allows a police officer to: 
[S]top a person in a public place located within the geographical area of 
such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person 
is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or 
(b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his 
name, address and an explanation of his conduct.240  
As an extension of its broken window policing policy,241 the New York City police 
department used the stop-and-frisk statute to direct “enforcement efforts at 
statistical ‘hot spots’ of criminal activity[.]” 242  The result was an exponential 
increase in the number of minorities who were stopped to investigate minor 
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offenses.243 The stops were aggressive,244 and statistics suggest that they targeted 
African Americans and Hispanic American youth.245 
In Floyd v. City of New York, several New York City citizens alleged that the 
New York police department practiced racial profiling when conducting 
investigatory detentions in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.246 Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, in a lengthy and well-
developed opinion, found that New York City officials had been deliberately 
indifferent to an unconstitutional policing policy that (1) permitted stops and frisks 
to be made on less than reasonable suspicion, and (2) utilized widespread practices 
that targeted blacks and Hispanics for stops. 247  In writing the opinion Judge 
Scheindlin found the following facts were uncontested: 
• Between January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 
million Terry stops.  
• The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to 
a high of 686,000 in 2011.  
• 52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons. A 
weapon was found after 1.5% of these frisks. In other words, in 
98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks, no weapon was found.  
• 8% of all stops led to a search into the stopped person’s clothing, 
ostensibly based on the officer feeling an object during the frisk 
that he suspected to be a weapon, or immediately perceived to 
be contraband other than a weapon. In 9% of these searches, the 
felt object was in fact a weapon. 91% of the time, it was not. In 
14% of these searches, the felt object was in fact contraband. 86% 
of the time it was not.  
• 6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. 
The remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further 
law enforcement action.  
• In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black.  
• In 31% the person was Hispanic.  
• In 10% the person was white. 
• In 2010, New York City’s resident population was roughly 23% black, 
29% Hispanic, and 33% white.  
• In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the 
officer recorded using force. The number for whites was 17%.  
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• Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the 
stops of Hispanics, and 1.4% of the stops of whites.  
• Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of 
blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the stops of 
whites.  
. . . . 
• Between 2004 and 2009, the percentage of stops where the officer 
failed to state a specific suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%. 248 
Her analysis of the evidence revealed that, regardless of the racial 
composition of a geographic area, blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be 
stopped. 249  Once stopped, blacks were 30% more likely than whites to be 
arrested. 250  Minorities were 9-14% more likely to be subjected to the use of 
force.251  She also found that the hit rate for blacks, as measured by the issuance of 
a summons or an arrest, was 8% lower than for white suspects.252  This evidence 
demonstrated that minorities were targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of 
suspicion.253 Judge Scheindlin also found evidence that officers were encouraged to 
make stops based on racial characteristics or stereotypes—to target the young 
blacks and Hispanics.254  
Judge Scheindlin found that New York City police officers used a combination 
of variables, such as race, high crime area, and the suspect’s demeanor to justify 
their stops.255 However, it appears that race and factors related to race, such as a 
high crime area, were controlling when determining who should be detained.256 The 
use of these variables in Terry stops has become prevalent.257 They are used to 
suggest reasonable suspicion although all other factors in the case are innocent 
activities.258 Under conditions such as those that existed in New York City’s police 
department and police departments of other cities, it becomes imperative that 
courts, in their best judgment, prevent unconstitutional abuses of Terry’s failures.259 
As Judge Scheindlin adeptly stated:  
This Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police 
behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. Many police 
practices may be useful for fighting crime—preventive detention or 
coerced confessions, for example—but because they are unconstitutional 
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they cannot be used, no matter how effective.260 
Terry was not designed to legalize unconstitutional police investigatory 
practices. 261  Courts are to “still retain their traditional responsibility to guard 
against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing” and that violates 
constitutional principles.262 
Judge Scheindlin had her detractors who suggested that the methods used by 
the New York City police department were valuable tools in crime detection and 
prevention.263 They cited statistics showing a reduction in crime rates during the 
period that the aggressive stop and search campaign took place.264 Their theory was 
simply that in order to reduce increasing crime, the police department’s limited 
resources required it to fight crime in areas with the highest crime rates.265 Her 
opponents also argue the benefit of stop and frisk, crime detection and prevention, 
“accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.” 266  This argument is 
greatly flawed. Aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics in minority communities have 
caused resentment from the residents, a distrust of the police, and a cavalier 
attitude about reporting crime and assisting police officers. 267  Hence, the 
acrimonious relationship between citizens who experience inept policing and the 
police may result in higher crime rates because the tactics alienate the community, 
rather than encourage cooperation and a partnership with police.268  
VI. AN ATTEMPT TO END RACIAL PROFILING 
Despite the arguments posited by supporters of New York’s stop-and-frisk, 
Judge Scheindlin found that the city had illegally detained and frisked minority 
residents on the streets over many years.269 In a “Remedies Opinion” to Floyd v. City 
of New York, she ordered several measures designed to give guidance to New York 
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provided additional evidence supporting this conclusion.  
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City police officers when conducting investigatory stops, and to improve police 
and community relations. Among those measures were:  
(1) She appointed an independent monitor to oversee the reform process;270  
(2) The New York Police Department should revise its policies and training 
regarding stop and frisk to adhere to constitutional standards;271  
(3) The New York Police Department should revise its policies and training 
regarding racial profiling to make clear that targeting the “right people” for stops is 
a form of racial profiling and violates the Constitution;272  
(4) The department will provide standards for what constitutes a stop, when 
a stop may be conducted, when a frisk may be conducted, and when a search into 
clothing or into any object found during a search may be conducted;273  
(5) All uniformed officers are required to provide narrative descriptions of 
stops in their activity logs;274  
(6) The department is to develop an improved system for monitoring, 
supervision, and discipline officers;275  
(7) Body cameras are to be worn and utilized by officers when making a 
stop.276 
A Second Circuit panel stayed Judge Scheindlin’s order pending an appeal by 
the city.277 The panel found Judge Scheindlin had compromised the appearance of 
impartiality.278 It remanded the case with orders that Judge Scheindlin be removed 
and a new judge appointed.279 Consequently, there was an agenda change in the 
mayor’s office, and the new administration filed a motion for remand to allow the 
parties to discuss settlement.280 The motion was granted.281 After much wrangling 
in the court, the City and police department finally moved forward to institute 
reform.  
The reforms have produced a remarkable drop in the rate of unlawful stop-
and-frisks.282 However, the ratio of African Americans detained in relation to other 
groups has not changed.283 There are fewer stops-and-frisks, but African Americans 
still suffer the brunt of the stops.284 Judge Scheindlin’s remedies inability to resolve 
the racial-profiling problem can only be attributed to the police department’s 
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continued use of race and high-crime areas as primary factors for stops; factors that 
Judge Scheindlin recognized as salient in a Terry stop-and-frisk. 285  Until courts 
recognize the impropriety of the use of race and high crime areas as determinants 
in stop-and-frisk and remove them from the equation, racial profiling will continue 
to exist. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Terry Court’s attempt to reach a compromise between temporary police 
detentions and public outrage at overaggressive police actions was meant to bring 
civility to a fragile situation. However, the decision failed to address possible 
outcomes that would inflict greater abuses of the Fourth Amendment on racial 
minorities. By failing to properly define a constitutionally valid stop, the Court left 
the door open to what has become an open season for frivolous stops of young 
African-American men and other ethnic minorities. Changes in police policies based 
on measures similar to those fashioned by Judge Scheindlin in Floyd v. City of New 
York are only the first step in ending rampant racially motivated stops of minority 
citizens. Until the Court exercises “judicial integrity” in stop-and-frisk cases, and 
revisit policies established in its Fourth Amendment cases that have become 
progenitors of racial profiling, Terry will be the Warren Court’s greatest failure that 
was meant for good.286  
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